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Abstract - Routing is the one of the essential criteria at network level in mobile ad hoc networks. Ad hoc network routing protocols
are difficult to design, and secure because unable to handle rapid node mobility and network topology changes. It has been realized
by many researchers, and several “secure” routing protocols have been proposed for ad hoc networks. However, the security of those
protocols has mainly been analyzed by informal means only. In this paper, we argue that flaws in ad hoc routing protocols can be
very subtle, and we advocate a more systematic way of analysis. This approach is based on the simulation paradigm, which has
already been used extensively for the analysis of key establishment protocols, but to the best of our knowledge, it has not. A new ondemand source routing protocol, called endairA, and demonstrate the usage of our framework by proving security. It is analyzed and
shown that the security proof for the route discovery algorithm, endairA is flawed due to hidden channel attack. To overcome this
flaw of EndairA algorithm, we uses acknowledgement based reply to find a secured route which provides more security and
overcomes the hidden channel attack in the existing approaches.
Keywords - Mobile ad hoc networks, hidden channel, provable security, routing protocols, secure routing.

I.

is a needed prerequisite for these applications. Each
node is directly connected to all nodes within it’s
possess effective transmission range and the
communication among the nodes that are not within
range of each other is accomplished by establishing and
using multi-hop routes that involve other nodes which
act as routers. New nodes can join the network at any
time and existing nodes can leave the network as well.

INTRODUCTION

A Mobile Ad-hoc Network is a multi-hop packet
based wireless network composed of a set of mobile
nodes, in which nodes assist by forwarding packets for
each other to allow them to communicate and move at
the same time, without using any kind of fixed wired
infrastructure. It is self-organizing, rapidly deployable,
adaptive and dynamic reconfigurable network of mobile
nodes connected by wireless links. Node acts as host
and router to support in transmitting data to other nodes
in its range. MANET is differs from wired/wireless
networks in that there is no central control, no base
station, no access points and no wireless switches. It can
be quickly and inexpensively set up as needed and it can
be used in scenarios in which no infrastructure exists, or
in which the existing infrastructure does not meet
application requirements for reasons such as security or
cost.

Ad hoc network routing protocols are difficult to
design, and secure because unable to handle rapid node
mobility and network topology changes. Due to the
dynamic nature of MANETs, designing communications
and networking protocols for these networks is a
challenging process. Routing in a MANET has two
phases: route discovery and route maintenance. Route
Discovery is the technique in which a node S intend to
send a packet to destination D and get hold of a route to
D. Route Maintenance is the mechanism in which node
S is able to detect, while using a route to D and that
have one or more links along the route have failed.
When a broken link is discovered, the source can use
another route or can revoke Route Discovery.

There are numerous applications of MANETs, each
having different characteristics such as network size
(geographic range and number of nodes), rate of
topological change, node mobility, communication
requirements, and data characteristics. Applications such
as military, disaster recovery and mine site operation,
conferences, classroom, campus, may benefit from ad
hoc networking, but secure and reliable communication

MANET routing protocols are generally classified
into two types and they are proactive and demand based.
Proactive routing continually maintains information on
all available paths using periodic updates so when a
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packet needs to be sent, routes are known and can be
used immediately. The proactive method takes little
time to discover routes but must maintain routing
information for unused paths. Demand based routing,
rather than maintaining paths between all nodes at all
times, invokes a route discovery procedure on demand.
Demand based schemes use less network bandwidth as
they avoid sending unnecessary routing information but
they typically take longer to discover routes.
On-demand routing protocols [1] have been
demonstrated to perform better with significantly lower
overheads than periodic or proactive routing protocols in
many situations, since they are able to react quickly to
the many changes that may occur in node connectivity,
yet are able to reduce (or eliminate) routing overhead in
periods or areas of the network in which changes are
less frequent.
Security of a routing protocol means that it can
perform its functions even in the presence of an
adversary whose objective is to prevent the correct
functioning of the protocol. Regarding the capabilities
of the adversary, we assume that it can mount active
attacks such as eavesdrop, modify, delete, insert, and
replay messages. However, we make the realistic
assumption that the adversary is not all powerful, by
which we mean that it cannot eavesdrop, modify, or
control all communications of the honest participants.
The adversarial nodes may be connected through
proprietary,
out-of-band
channels
and
share
information.
MANET routing protocols are vulnerable to
attacks, such as denial of service, packet delay, packet
modification, packet dropping, and spoofing. Both the
ad hoc routing process and the data communication, or
data forwarding, phases must be secured in order to
provide a complete solution.
The three properties must be maintained for a
routing protocol to meet its objectives. A routing
protocol is accurate if it produces routes and reliable if
it’s returned routes are always accurate, even if nonmalicious failures occur. In order to provide a security, a
routing protocol needs to preserve the Protocol's
accuracy and reliability in the face of malicious
attackers.
In this paper, we focus on the area of secure routing
protocols for ad hoc networks. First, given model
describes the possible types of attacks in such a system
and depict several new attacks on ad hoc network
routing protocols. Second, present the design and
performance evaluation of a new on-demand secure ad
hoc network routing protocol, called endairA, and
demonstrate the usage of our framework by proving
security. It is analyzed and shown that the security proof

for the route discovery algorithm, endairA is flawed due
to hidden channel attack. To overcome this flaw of
EndairA algorithm, we uses acknowledgement based
reply to find a secured route which provides more
security and overcomes the hidden channel attack in the
existing approaches.
II. ON-DEMAND SECURE ROUTING
ALGORITHMS
Several researchers have proposed secure routing
protocols. In that we have used many routing algorithm
and all these secure routing protocols that have been
proposed to reduce the risk of attacking the routing
protocols.
Many secure routing protocols [10] aim to prevent
the establishment of falsified routes. Security-Aware Ad
hoc Routing (SAR) is a reactive routing protocol. It
defines the trust degree that should be associated with
each node, and ensures that a node is prevented from
handling a Route Request (RREQ) unless it provides the
required level. Here the data packets will be sent only
through trusted nodes, with respect to the defined level.
1.

ARAN Protocol:

Authenticated Routing for Ad-Hoc Networks
(ARAN) is an on-demand, ad-hoc routing protocol that
uses certificates to ensure authentication, message
integrity, and non-repudiation of routing messages in an
ad hoc networking environment. Based on logical route
metrics and certificates, ARAN is immune to
modification, impersonation, and fabrication of routing
messages.
The ARAN[4],[8],[11] secure routing protocol is an
on-demand routing protocol that detects and protects
against malicious actions carried out by third parties and
peers in the ad hoc environment. ARAN introduces
authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation as
part of minimal security policy for the ad hoc
environment and consists of a preliminary certification
process, a mandatory end to-end authentication stage
and an optional second stage that provides secure
shortest paths. ARAN requires the use of a trusted
certificate server (T): before entering in the ad hoc
network, each node has to request a certificate signed by
T. The certificate contains the IP address of the node, its
public key, a timestamp of when the certificate was
created and a time at which the certificate expires along
with the signature by T. All nodes are supposed to
maintain fresh certificates with the trusted server and
must know T’s public key.
The goal of the first stage of the ARAN protocol is
for the source to verify that the intended destination was
reached. As with any secure system based on
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cryptographic certificates, the key revocation issue has
to be addressed in order to make sure that expired or
revoked certificates do not allow the holder to access the
network.

Fig. 2.1 : The ARAN protocol
(An example with 4 nodes)
In ARAN, when a certificate needs to be revoked,
the trusted certificate server T sends a broadcast
message to the ad hoc group that announces the
revocation. Any node receiving this message
rebroadcasts it to its neighbors. Revocation notices need
to be stored until the revoked certificate would have
expired normally. Any neighbor of the node with the
revoked certificate needs to reform routing as necessary
to avoid transmission through the now un-trusted node.
This method is not failsafe.
In some cases, the un-trusted node that is having its
certificate revoked may be the sole connection between
two parts of the ad hoc network. In this case, the nontrusted node might not forward the notice of revocation
for its certificate, resulting in a partition of the network,
as nodes that have received the revocation notice will no
longer forward messages through the un-trusted node,
while all other nodes depend on it to reach the rest of the
network. This only lasts as long as the un-trusted node's
certificate would have otherwise been valid, or until the
un-trusted node is no longer the sole connection
between the two partitions. At the time that the revoked
certificate should have expired, the un-trusted node is
unable to renew the certificate, and routing across that
node ceases. Additionally, to detect this situation and to
hasten the propagation of revocation notices, when a
node meets a new neighbor, it can exchange a summary
of its revocation notices with that neighbor; if these
summaries do not match, the actual signed notices can
be forwarded and re-broadcasted to restart propagation
of the notice.
2.

SAODV Protocol:

Mobile ad hoc networks are vulnerable to various
security threats because of its dynamic topology and self
configurable nature. SAODV (Secure Ad hoc On

Demand Vector routing) is an implementation of SAR
on AODV. It is one of the popular secure mechanisms
which take the help of digital signature and hash chain
techniques to secure AODV packets. Since, digital
signature technique consumes heavy computational
time, the degradation of SAODV performance can be a
major issue. In a recent work called A-SAODV
(Adaptive SAODV), an adaptive mechanism that tunes
the behavior of SAODV improves its performance.
In this paper we have proposed an extension to
Adaptive SAODV of the secure AODV protocol
extension, which includes further filtering strategies
aimed at improving its performance. Moreover, we
analyze how our proposed algorithm can help to further
improve the performance of adaptive SAODV. One of
the problems of this approach is the definition of the
trust level. Further, assuming that nodes showing the
required trust level are genuine is not always correct.
3.

SRP Protocol:

Source routing protocols (SRP) is an on-demand
secure source routing protocol that captures the basic
features of reactive routing. It prevents spoofing attacks.
This protocol uses a reactive approach which eliminates
the need to periodically flood the network with table
update messages which are required in a table-driven
approach. The intermediate nodes also utilize the route
cache information efficiently to reduce the control
overhead.
The connection setup delay is higher than in tabledriven protocols. Even though the protocol performs
well in static and low-mobility environments, the
performance degrades rapidly with increasing mobility.
Also, considerable routing overhead is involved due to
the source-routing mechanism employed in DSR. This
routing overhead is directly proportional to the path
length. Route requests generated by a source S are
protected by MACs computed using a key shared with
the target T. Requests are broadcast to all the neighbors
of S. The disadvantage of this protocol is that the route
maintenance mechanism does not locally repair a broken
link.
4.

Ariadne Protocol:

ARIADNE [7],[8] (A Secure On-Demand Routing
Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks) is an on-demand secure
adhoc routing protocol based on DSR that withstands
node compromise and relies only on highly efficient
symmetric cryptography. ARIADNE guarantees that the
target node of a route discovery process can authenticate
the initiator, that the initiator can authenticate each
intermediate node on the path to the destination present
in the RREP message and that no intermediate node can
remove a previous node in the node list in the RREQ
(Route Request) or RREP (Route Replay).
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Operation:

7.

As for the Secure Routing Protocol (SRP), protocol
ARIADNE needs some mechanism to bootstrap
authentic keys required by the protocol. In particular,
each node needs a shared secret key (KS, D) is the
shared key between a source S and a destination D with
each node it communicates with at a higher layer, an
authentic TESLA key for each node in the network and
an authentic “Route Discovery chain” element for each
node for which this node wi ll forward RREQ messages.

The ABV model [1],[2],[4],[6],[7] is a security
framework proposed by Acs, Buttyan and Vajda[1] used
to analyze on-demand routing algorithms, SRP and
Ariadne and finds them insecure against hidden channel
attacks. ABV proposed to merge faulty neighbor nodes
into a single node. So the neighbor nodes of a faulty
node on a route are not faulty. Consequently, adversarial
nodes are, by definition, never adjacent in the ABV
model. This is an arbitrary restriction that greatly limits
the scope of the security statements in the ABV model
in their ability to capture realistic security requirements.

Features:
(i) ARIADNE provides point-to-point authentication
of a routing message using a message
authentication code (MAC) and a shared key
between the two parties.
(ii) For authentication of a broadcast packet such as
RREQ, ARIADNE uses the TESLA broadcast
authentication protocol.
(iii) Selfish nodes are not taken into account.
Strengths:
(i) ARIADNE copes with attacks performed by
malicious nodes that modify and fabricate routing
information, with attacks using impersonation and,
in an advanced version, with the wormhole attack.
(ii) ARIADNE is protected also from a flood of RREQ
packets that could lead to the cache poisoning
attack. (iii) ARIADNE is immune to the wormhole
attack only in its advanced version: using an
extension called TIK (TESLA with Instant Key
disclosure) that requires tight clock synchronization
between the nodes; it is possible to detect anomalies
caused by a wormhole based on timing
discrepancies.
5.

Security-Aware Ad-Hoc Routing (SAR):

Security-Aware Ad-Hoc Routing (SAR)[2] is the
generalized framework for any on demand ad-hoc
routing protocol. SAR requires that nodes having same
trust level must share a secret key. SAR augments the
routing process using hash digests and symmetric
encryption mechanisms. The signed hash digests
provide message integrity while the encryption of
packets ensures their confidentiality.
6. Secure Link State Routing Protocol SLSP:

Secure Link State Routing Protocol (SLSP)
provides secure proactive topology discovery and can be
used as either as a stand-alone protocol or as a part of
Hybrid routing framework when combined with a
reactive protocol.

ABV Model:

However, this model is not left to identify a
problem with the security proof of endairA. So, for the
sake of argument, we also assume that adversarial nodes
are never adjacent. This implies that the route can be
uniquely partitioned as follows: each partition consists
of a single non compromised identifier or a sequence of
consecutive compromised identifiers.
It is concluded that the proof makes the
unwarranted assumption that no direct channels imply
no direct bandwidth between adversarial nodes; the
proof is therefore incomplete. It could be possible that
the security claims remained valid even as their proof is
incorrectly argued. Fundamentally, endairA and the
ABV model was developed to deal with a class of
hidden channels, the intrinsic hidden channels of a
wireless broadcast medium in a neighborhood.
However, security is not achieved because other hidden
channels remain present.
III. MODELING ENDAIRA PROTOCOL:
Inspired by Ariadne with digital signatures, a
routing protocol is designed that can be proven to be
statistically secure. The protocol is called as endairA,
which is the reverse of Ariadne because instead of
signing the route request, it is proposed that intermediate
nodes should sign the route reply.
The route request format of EndairA is,
MsgS,T,rreq = (rreq,S,T,id,X1……Xj )
The route reply format of EndairA is,
MsgS,T,rrep=(rrep,S,T,id, X1…X

p ,sigT,….

sigXj)

Each intermediate node also verifies that the digital
signatures in the reply are valid and that they correspond
to the following identifiers in the node list and to the
target. If these verifications fail, then the reply is
dropped. Otherwise, it is signed by the intermediate
node, and passed to the next node on the route towards
the initiator. When the initiator receives the route reply,
it verifies if the first identifier in the route carried by the
reply belongs to a neighbor. If so, then it verifies all the
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signatures in the reply. If all these verifications are
successful, then the initiator accepts the route.
Analysis of EndairA:
The protocol, EndairA is claimed to be proven
secure in the ABV security framework. The proof of
security of endairA is revisited and flaw is identified.
The proof considers the possibility of an attack against
endairA being successful, hoping to achieve a
contradiction. However, Acs, Buttya´n, and Vajda
exclude such faulty routes which may appear shorter
than actual network routes by collusion of adjacent
adversarial nodes by subsuming all adjacent adversarial
nodes.

with source node S and let, (S, A, X, B, A, D, T) be a
sequence of identifiers of pairwise neighbor nodes in
which only X; Y are faulty.
In the attack, when the second faulty node Y receives,
msgS,T,rreq=(rreq, S, T, id, A, X, B)
It drops node B from the listing and transmits,
msgS,T,rreq=(rreq, S, T, id, A, X, Y)
Eventually, the route request will reach the target T,
which will compute and send back a route reply. Node
Y will then receive from D,
msgS,T,rreq=(rreq,S,T,id,A, X, Y, D, sigT,sigD)

A plausible route is one whose partitions
correspond to that of a real route that physically exists in
the network. The security statement of endairA is that it
only accepts plausible routes. Note that this statement
also does not consider an adversarial lengthening of a
route by assignment of multiple labels to a single
compromised network node as an attack.

Now, Y can obviously attach its label and signature to
this reply and transmit to B the extended reply, but B
will not retransmit it because B is not included in the
listing. However, suppose that Y had earlier received a
request from D to find a route linking it to A.

EndairA algorithm proposed by ABV is analyzed
and shown that the security proof for the route discovery
algorithm for endairA is flawed due to hidden channel
attack. To overcome the flaw of EndairA, we uses
acknowledgement based reply to find a secured route,
which provides security and overcomes the hidden
channel attack. We uses hash based technique in which,
whenever a source sends its route request to its
neighbors, the neighbor node which receives the route
request send an acknowledgement based reply that it has
received the route request and hence it avoids the
presence of faulty nodes by which the source receiving
the identity of every node in the network and hence the
network is more secure without malicious nodes.
Therefore the route discovered is secure. It is concluded
that the proof makes the unwarranted assumption that no
direct channels imply any direct bandwidth between
adversarial nodes; the proof is therefore incomplete.

The process of routing discovery is like DSR which
only some security considerations. Routing discovery
means data moves from source to the destination. Data
transfer from source to the destination, Behavior in case
of error

IV. ROUTING DISCOVERY:

1st Solution: The CONFIDANT Protocol
Idea: punish non collaborative/malicious nodes
by non-forwarding their traffic.
Detection through “neighborhood watch”
Building a distributed system of reputation
Enable “re-socialization” through timeouts in the
black list.
2nd Solution: Nuglets
Idea: virtual currency to buy the collaboration
Nuglets are attached to the message
Each relaying node takes nuglets form the
message which can use to buy the routing of its
own message
Nuglet module must be implemented in a tamper
resistant hardware to avoid cheating.
3rd Solution: Securing Routing Information

Fig. 2.2 : The endairA routing protocol

Idea: share the routing information through a
secure channel

An attack on Endair A:

Requires
Key
Security Mechanisms

This is a hidden channel attack that does not require
out-of-band resources. Consider an instance of endairA

Management and
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VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the ABV model, a new security
framework tailored for on-demand route discovery
protocols in MANETs was proposed. A new on-demand
source routing protocol, called endairA, and
demonstrate the usage of our framework by proving
security. It is analyzed and shown that the security proof
for the route discovery algorithm i.e. EndairA which
represents formal security model that can deal with
concurrent attacks and is successful in mitigating a class
of hidden channel attacks, the attacks that are intrinsic
to the wireless broadcast medium in a neighborhood.
This provides efficient security to the mobile ad hoc
network and there is no possibility for hidden channel
attack and the route discovered is highly secured.
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